Abstract: This Article investigates the political and military conditions under
INTRODUCTION
States use international norms and laws in the pursuit of extralegal ends. Far from a provocation, the foregoing statement is regarded today as true by diplomats, foreign policy pundits, and academics alike.
1 Political scientists, for instance, have explored how, and to what ends, both state and non-state actors manipulate norms and legal provisions. 2 In brief, as international politics become increasingly entangled in treaties and other legal instruments, both state and non-state actors have regarded international law ("IL") as instrumental in the pursuit of foreign policy goals, and thus integral to the logic behind conducting international affairs. 3 Similarly, legal experts and scholars have acknowledged the systematic use of international law for extralegal ends. A new term-"lawfare"-was coined to conceptualize the new logic at play. 4 This term has proven useful in that it defines instances whereby state and non-state actors resort to IL provisions and institutions for their military or political byproducts, rather than their intended legal effects. The International Criminal Court ("ICC)" has played an increasingly central role within this ongoing global trend, referred to as the "legalization" of international politics. 5 The ICC's prominence in "waging lawfare" is a function of its potentially unlimited temporal and territorial jurisdiction, as well as the shift from state to individual criminal accountability that its establishment enabled. 6 This Article explores the political and military conditions under which national governments invite judicial scrutiny from the ICC. The academic payoff of undertaking such a study, as well as its intended contribution to the field of international law and politics, is threefold. First, it sheds new light on the systematic exploitation and subversion of the ICC-hereby conceived of as both a legal regime and international organization-for extralegal purposes. More specifically, this Article reveals that government decisions to "outsource" criminal jurisdiction to independent third parties do not happen randomly. Rather, national governments conceive of this possibility as an alternative course of action to conflict-resolution efforts. Second, a better understanding of why governments invite external judicial scrutiny must start In Charles Dunlap's authoritative definition, lawfare is "the strategy of using-or misusing-law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective." Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today: A Perspective, 3 YALE J. INT'L AFF. 146, 146 (2008) . with the identification of the political and military conditions in which said decisions occur. Third, a cross-case analysis of seven countries shows there is more to these decisions than state leaders' self-interest. Establishing whether or not to invite external judicial scrutiny is a complex decision for state leaders, but adopting an individual level of analysis unduly narrows our understanding of the underlying decision-making processes. Hence, shifting the level of analysis from individual to state offers a more fine-grained picture of what is at stake when governments ask for ICC involvement in internal affairs. To be clear, this is not tantamount to underestimating-let alone ignoring-the salience of state leaders' self-interest and preferences. On this point, there is a wealth of evidence supporting the claim that sitting heads of state, from Ugandan President Museveni to Congolese President Kabila, thought they would personally benefit from involving the ICC in domestic affairs. 7 Yet, as this Article demonstrates, a state leader's interest in retaining power is but one of several factors contributing to the decision to invite ICC scrutiny.
In all, the logic of inviting external judicial scrutiny must be analyzed, and its efficacy assessed, in light of the broader military and political strategies states adopt. These strategies reflect state preferences when coping with internal threats within an ever-tightening normative and institutional global governance structure. Given this legalistic structure, the invitation of external judicial scrutiny amounts to a wartime tactic to which governments resort in the pursuit of their strategic goals. Furthermore, the context wherein incumbent governments decide which strategy to pursue matters tremendously.
On this point, some preliminary observations on the universe of cases highlight commonalities in seemingly heterogeneous situations. First, governments invited external judicial scrutiny in situations where armed rebel groups contested their authority or posed a threat to their survival. In many of such cases, governments had no control over large portions of national territory at the time they formally requested external judicial scrutiny. Second, the same governments proved unable to achieve military victory against the internal threats they confronted. A military's inability to quash a rebellion and win a war is one of the two independent variables that determine the likelihood of governments asking for external judicial scrutiny. Lastly, external actors' preferences must be taken into account as well, for they affect-albeit indirectly-the decision of governments to invite external judicial scrutiny or call for the establishment of new international courts ("ICs"). As security scholars correctly point out, state-initiated brute force is seldom a viable, let alone uncontested, option in an increasingly legalized international system. 8 In fact, the international community has generally proven unwilling to pour sizable military, political, and economic resources into conflict management or resolution in peripheral countries, showing even less eagerness to intervene in Africa.
9 Accordingly, major global players hold a marked preference for short-term solutions-solutions whose long-term validity is being increasingly questioned. Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities usually precede the deployment of peacekeepers and the brokering of inclusive power-sharing agreements aimed at giving rebel groups (and the people they allegedly represent) a stake in state affairs.
10 Scholars noticed this "standardized" path to conflict resolution can have adverse consequences; in particular, it can incentivize non-state armed groups to use the escalation of violence as a method of obtaining a seat at the negotiating table.
11
As this three-party peacemaking process unfolds, it becomes increasingly clear that the likely loser is the state, whose sovereignty and authority global players readily sacrifice to appease the rebels. Unsurprisingly, national governments, as legitimate state representatives and acting sovereigns, resist externally sponsored power-sharing agreements that demean their standing and legitimize internal enemies as trustworthy partners in peace.
12 Against this backdrop, national governments begin to rethink the invitation of external judicial scrutiny as a means to criminalize internal enemies. They do so in hopes of forestalling power-sharing agreements or undermining their implementation.
13
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part II surveys the literature on the strategic use of international laws and institutions. The same section also engages with scholarly work on power-sharing in conflictridden countries and suggests that state referrals (also referred to as "selfreferrals") to the ICC are better conceived of as governmental responses to undesired external political or military interference in internal affairs. Part III lays out the theoretical argument and outlines the research design and case selection. Part IV compares seven countries' situations pending before the ICC, demonstrating that the theory detailed in Part III translates easily across continents. The Article concludes by highlighting the causal nexus between state-led processes of norm exploitation, norm subversion, and war continuation and, in so doing, contributes to the development of mid-level theories on state use of IL in the pursuit of extralegal objectives.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
To fully appreciate the tactical power of inviting external judicial scrutiny, this section offers a brief survey of the scholarship on issues relevant to the theoretical argument laid out below. The first topic to be addressed is state agency in the processes of norm exploitation and subversion. In ("LRA"), but not from state armed forces. 15 For others, state invitation of ICC scrutiny was instrumental in criminalizing the LRA, undermining peace talks, and marginalizing domestic and international actors pushing for political solutions. 16 These arguments do not apply exclusively to Uganda, for prominent legal scholars have noticed "striking similarities" with both Democratic Republic of Congo ("DRC") and Central African Republic ("CAR") self-referrals and, more recently, the declaration under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute lodged by the government of Côte d'Ivoire in April of 2003.
17
The second topic of interest is the link between power-sharing agreements and state invitation of external judicial scrutiny. Colby College professor of government Kenneth Rodman and his former student Petie Booth, whose work lies at the crossroads between international law and conflict studies, note that "negotiated resolutions of civil wars are most likely when there is a 'mutually hurting stalemate' in which all of the parties recognize that they cannot win and will be worse off the longer the war continues."
18 Stalemates have become the rule rather than the exception as definitive victories in both interstate and civil wars have declined in number.
19
That so many wars end in draws today is likely due not only to the military weakness of national armies, but also to other factors such as the technologies of rebellion or geography. 20 Lastly, this author argues that incumbent governments invite ICC scrutiny to either forestall or undermine externally imposed power-sharing accords. On foreign interference in internal conflicts, Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, two prominent international relations scholars at Columbia University, conclude that "powerful outsiders" acting like guarantors are almost necessary for reaching a political solution to end civil wars. 22 Foreign preference forif not obsession with-conflict management explains why "[p]olitical powersharing agreements have become an almost standard ingredient of negotiated settlements to civil wars in Africa, as elsewhere." 23 On the one hand, this attitude is the backbone of short-term initiatives aimed at stopping violence. 24 On the other hand, it reveals both a preference for low-cost political options and a lack of commitment to creating conditions for lasting peace. 25 The limits intrinsic to this approach of conflict management are known to the proponents of power-sharing agreements, for they regard political solutions engineered to reduce the security dilemma as second-best solutions. 26 Finally, a brief mention of the politics of conflict management is due. A long-known criticism of power-sharing is that it "reifies the contending groups" 27 because "external mediators . . . conceive all the parties [to a civil conflict] as subsisting on a more or less equal footing." 28 Rebel groups are well aware that peace negotiations greatly enhance their international standing 29 and, accordingly, are becoming increasingly proficient in the art of diplomacy-formerly the exclusive domain of state actors. 30 Bearing in mind the enmity between negotiating parties and the external pressures exerted on them, it might not be surprising that "most negotiated peace agreements fail during the implementation phase."
31 Government and non-state armed groups have different reasons for defecting, but a thorough analysis of such reasons is beyond the scope of this Article. However, one overlooked and understudied way in which incumbent governments undertake to sabotage 22 peace talks is to co-opt international criminal tribunals ("ICTs") in the criminalization of their enemies so as to strip them of their newly bestowed legitimacy.
III. THEORETICAL ARGUMENT
International criminal law ("ICL") and ICTs have changed the landscape of modern warfare in ways policymakers and treaty drafters never could have foreseen. The aim of this Article is not to assess whether the aforementioned change represents a major or minor development in twentyfirst century military affairs; rather, it purports to illustrate how the introduction of these IL institutions has affected state decision-making by ushering in wartime tactics which were previously unavailable. To be clear, lawfare is not an option to which states should resort if maximizing the impact of external judicial scrutiny is their intent. Moreover, it is worth recalling that not all state leaders who decide to invite ICC scrutiny fully understand the implications of doing so beforehand. Table 1 illustrates both the novelty introduced by state invitation of external judicial scrutiny and the alternatives to the latter if and when the underlying conditions vary. All the aforementioned situations were in the lower-right quadrant at the time their governments formally invited ICC scrutiny. A few remarks on how to correctly read Table 1 : first, it offers an overview-not a taxonomy-of the alternative tactics national governments can employ under different conditions. In other words, governments are not limited by the tactical options listed in Table 1 , which nevertheless maps their adoption in accordance with how the two independent variables-i.e. military ability and state preferences-combine. Second, Table 1 allows for movement from one quadrant to another as change in either government preferences or military ability occurs. For instance, the Ugandan government held constant its preference for war over time, yet it changed tactics depending on whether or not the LRA was within or beyond reach due to geography. Lastly, this study's focus on the conditions underpinning state invitation of external judicial scrutiny allows the bracketing of endogeneity problems. Indeed, it is fair to argue that a military's ability to win a conflict may affect state preference for war, while state preference for peace may avert-or stop-military build-up (Table 1 's upper-right and lower-left quadrants). Still, this study is exclusively interested in explaining one particular-and to some extent counterintuitive-combination of the two independent variables. As far as the outcome of interest (i.e. state invitation of external judicial scrutiny) is concerned, endogeneity problems are successfully bracketed by the fact that national governments held a preference for continuing war over negotiating its conclusion despite their inability to win by military means.
It is now time to ask why the systematic state invitation of external judicial scrutiny is a noteworthy novelty and, relatedly, what it adds to the mainstream understanding of international law and politics. First, ICs-and ICTs in particular-provide national governments with an institutional avenue in which to overcome-to a certain extent, at least-military realities, and fend off external pressures to cease hostilities and enter peace negotiations.
32 Put another way, before ICs were co-opted into state strategies of resistance, Table 1 's lower-right quadrant was blank and national governments, willing but unable to prolong hostilities, could only resort to diplomatic initiatives. Second, state invitation of external judicial scrutiny affords a readily available and surprisingly effective credible commitment mechanism: a lesson Ugandan president Museveni learned the hard way when he considered rewarding the LRA's demobilization with amnesty for its leaders. In response to this suggestion, former ICC Chief Prosecutor MorenoOcampo clarified he "could not use his discretion to suspend the arrest warrants, which were non-negotiable."
33 ICC scholars have thus far neglected this aspect of self-referrals, overlooking the application of the credible commitment mechanism to war continuation and not just to war termination. Third, state invitation of external judicial scrutiny adds another tool to the state's arsenal of non-violent wartime tactics. 34 As with many other wartime tactics, moreover, the underlying political and military conditions prompt its adoption and predict its efficacy in the pursuit of broader strategic objectives.
Not all governments who are willing but unable to continue fighting necessarily invite external judicial scrutiny, yet all governments that eventually decided to do so were willing but unable to sustain their military efforts at the time they formally requested it. But what are the alternatives to this Article's outcome of interest, i.e. Table 1's lower right quadrant? The remainder of this section offers a brief overview of the potential changedetermined outcomes in one or both independent variables. First, governments who have both the will and means to sustain military efforts may resist pressures to negotiate a political solution to the conflict and continue fighting (upper-right quadrant), as the case of Sri Lanka aptly illustrates. 35 To defeat the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ("LTTE") rebellion and end twenty-five years of civil war, the Sri Lankan government allegedly employed military tactics that quite blatantly violated international humanitarian law 32 On the conceptualization of lawfare as the weapon of the (militarily) weak, see Fisher ("IHL" or "laws of war") provisions. 36 On May 18, 2009, upon defeating the remaining LTTE resistance and killing top-ranked rebel officials, the Sri Lankan armed forces declared total victory and government control over the entire island. 38 It is also worth noting that power-sharing agreements are often sponsored (when not de facto imposed) by political patrons or international organizations-an interference that curtails state agency in the critical decision-making process on war termination. 39 Finally, incumbents may prefer non-military solutions to the conflict despite having the military capability to defeat the enemy in combat (upperright quadrant). Cases belonging to this quadrant include situations wherein the incumbent seeks either short-term (e.g., ceasefire) or long-term (e.g., peace treaty) political solutions to an ongoing conflict. At present, Colombia exemplifies a country whose armed forces enjoy overwhelming military superiority over active left-wing rebellions (namely the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-known by their Spanish acronym, FARC-and the National Liberation Army-known by their Spanish acronym, ELN), but whose national government favors peace negotiations over war continuation. 40 Colombia is also a fitting example in that political, ethical, and legal considerations shaped government preferences on conflict resolution. On this point, Colombian military and procurement officers, when 36 interviewed in fall 2016, affirmed that, from a purely military viewpoint, the armed forces could achieve total victory over the aforementioned rebel groups. 41 However, military victory becomes impossible to attain once political, ethical, and legal considerations are brought back into the picture. A war-winning strategy would likely entail not just the escalation of violence in a low-intensity conflict, but also employing tactics that would likely lead to gross violations of IHL norms. But the case of Colombia may well be the exception rather than the rule. 42 When national governments want to pause, but not to settle, an ongoing conflict, buying time can be a useful tactic. For instance, a ceasefire agreement can provide both the opportunity to test the enemy's credibility as a potential partner in peace, as well as time to engage foreign actors and possibly win their support in hopes of altering the balance of power among warring parties. 43 Ceasefire agreements can, at times, lead to lasting peace, Another country deserving membership in this category is Nigeria, despite the fact that its domestic situation is quite different from Colombia's. With 80,000 active military soldiers and 82,000 paramilitary, "Nigeria retains 41 Interview with a member of the armed forces, in Bogotá, Colombia (Nov. 9, 2017); Interview with a member of an administrative executive agency, in Bogotá, Colombia (Nov. 18, 2016 the best-funded and -equipped forces in West Africa." 46 Nigeria at once faces distinct security challenges and contributes around 5000 troops to nine peacekeeping missions throughout the African continent. 47 Yet countries like Nigeria may have a (temporary) interest in diverting human and financial resources away from one internal threat to deal with another-a tactic referred to as "state acquiescence" in Table 1 . 48 When the Nigerian government, in partnership with regional allies, launched major offensives against Boko Haram, as it did during 2015, "the number of Boko Haram attacks in the region . . . declined significantly." 49 In all, the example of Nigeria illustrates how variations in short-term preferences (e.g., peace versus war) explain the back-and-forth movement from one quadrant to another on Table 1 .
A. Research Design and Case Selection: Military (In)ability to Win a War
Military (in)ability to win a war is determined by the capability of state armed forces and paramilitaries to achieve key wartime objectives in a specific operating environment. 50 Military victory, in turn, is achieved either by quashing the enemy or capturing the territory under its control. For most selected cases, the main threat to government survival was internal rather than external. Incumbent governments have an ontological desire to stamp out sovereign competition and reassert control over areas that have fallen under rebel rule.
Borrowing from Oxford professor Stathis N. Kalyvas' conceptualization of civil wars as processes of competition over sovereignty, 51 this Article moves from the theoretical premise that national governments hold a long-term preference for uncontested sovereignty over their entire national territory. The first-and most intuitive-factor at play is the balance of power among belligerents. Simply put, state armies and pro-government militias may not be strong enough to defeat the enemy; it can be a matter of numbers (i.e. soldiers ready for deployment), military professionalism, the technology or availability of weapons, or any combination of these circumstances. 53 For example, the "hit-andrun" tactic has historically informed LRA operations directed at both military and civilian targets. 54 Commonly employed when weaker forces attack stronger opponents, this tactic puts rapidity of movement before territorial conquest and control, causing damage to the opponent and then quickly withdrawing before the latter can retaliate.
The third factor accounting for military (in)ability to win a war is political geography. The notion that the size and shape of nations-alongside population distribution within national borders-pose both hurdles and opportunities for governments has long been integral to the study of comparative politics. 55 The working definition of political geography herein employed is broader than usual in that it includes "artificial" hurdles to government power broadcasting, like the buffer zone established through the deployment of peacekeepers in post-genocide Rwanda and post-coup Côte d'Ivoire. 56 This addition is relevant in that the mainstream notion of political geography, while concerned with the state's ability to broadcast power over a defined territory, neither considers nor is meant to apply to countries experiencing an internal conflict.
The last factor is foreign military intervention or assistance. In theory, foreign military intervention on the side of-or assistance to-the rebellion can alter meaningfully the balance of power between warring parties. In practice, none of the domestic situations referred to ICTs were immune from some type of foreign military intervention or assistance to the rebellion. 57 In other words, none of the situations listed in Table 2 were purely national matters, as civil conflicts were consistently internationalized, albeit to different degrees. 
B. State Tactical Preferences (Peace versus War)
Military inability alone does not explain why incumbent governments turn to ICL norms and institutions to exacerbate, rather than settle, armed conflicts active within their national borders. As noted earlier, adverse military realities should push state decision-makers in the opposite direction, making conflict resolution more likely to follow, not less. Only by bringing in the second independent variable-namely state preference for prolonging hostilities-is it possible to account for the rationality and strategic purview of government decision-making. From a methodological standpoint, inferring preferences is an inevitably risky endeavor when advancing causal claims. To minimize the risk of doing so, this subsection sets forth a working definition of "state preferences," narrows its application, and operationalizes the variable into empirically observable factors.
It is worth recalling that the focus of this study is to explore and explain the seemingly odd and counterintuitive combination of political and military conditions underpinning state invitation of external judicial scrutiny, as illustrated in Table 1 . Consequently, this Article looks specifically at the short-term tactical preferences of states at the moment national authorities formally invite ICC scrutiny. State preferences are inferred by and operationalized through public speeches, press releases, meeting minutes, government-issued documents, and state behavior. To corroborate otherwise insufficient evidence, state preferences are best accounted for by a combination of statements and actions-as it happened for the Uganda referral-or a pattern of consistent action over time, like in the case of the Article 12(3) declaration submitted by the Ivorian government in April 2003.
C. Case Selection
The theoretical argument above draws primarily, albeit not exclusively, on past situations referred by national governments to the ICC through either a self-referral or a declaration of accepting the jurisdiction envisaged by Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute. It is worth noting that not all self-referrals or Article 12(3) declarations are considered in this study, but only those that occurred in conflict or post-conflict countries. Thus, the self-referrals submitted by the Union of the Comoros (2013) and Gabon (2016) are excluded on the ground that no armed conflict of any kind, whether intra-or interstate, high-or low-intensity, was ongoing in these countries at the time their governments invited ICC scrutiny. Conversely, country situations like Rwanda (1994) and Sierra Leone (2000-2002) fit into the theoretical framework, for they occurred at a historic juncture when ICTs had already become a reality, although established on an ad hoc, rather than permanent, basis. These two situations are particularly salient for the argument laid out in the previous section because they show national governments realizing ICTs' potential for norm subversion and exploitation before any such tribunal was established to adjudicate international crimes committed in their territory. In microeconomics terms, the demand for norm exploitation and subversion predated the supply of such norms.
On what counts as an armed conflict-and in line with the ICC's temporal and subject-matter jurisdiction-this Article looks at interstate, intrastate, and internationalized intrastate conflicts that were ongoing or broke out after July 1, 2002, when the Rome Statute entered into force. To make sure all armed conflicts falling within this time period are duly considered for case-selection purposes, this Article relies on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program at the department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University and the Center for the Study of Civil War at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset (Version 4-2016-the latest available online at the time of submission). 58 It is beyond the scope of this publication to map all conflicts listed in the abovementioned dataset; rather, this Article aims to demonstrate that all episodes of state-invited external judicial scrutiny occurred under the same conditions (see the bottomright quadrant of Table 1 ).
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

A. Côte d'Ivoire
The Ivorian Civil War officially broke out on September 19, 2002, when a loose coalition of non-state armed groups unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow President Laurent Gbagbo. 59 While rebel forces failed to take over Abidjan and seize power, they nevertheless succeeded in taking control of the northern half of Côte d'Ivoire. 60 The unpreparedness of the Ivorian armed 58 The original version of this dataset, widely used by researchers and policy makers alike, is described in Nils P. Gleditsch forces in responding to the rebel sortie in Abidjan, let alone to the broader offensive carried out in the northern regions, speaks directly to their military inability. In fall of 2002, Ivorian armed forces still remained loyal to Gbagbo's predecessor, military ruler General Robert Guéï. Gbagbo's mistrust of state armed forces led him to rely on the presidential guard, the gendarmerie, and militiamen loyal to him because of clientelistic linkages.
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It is also worth noting that, at that time, the Ivorian army was relatively small in comparison to other African standing armies addressed below, due to the Ivorian government's lasting reliance on France for protection from external threats.
62 Two more considerations are important to note. First, the main rebellion's estimated strength matched that of the Ivorian armed forces-a rare instance of balanced distribution of power between two sides. 63 Second, the sudden deployment of peacekeepers from France and the Economic Community of West African States ("ECOWAS") created a buffer zone and crystallized the initial balance of power, affording few opportunities for military confrontation between state and rebel forces. 66 The short timeline of three months-from January 23, 2003, when the abovementioned agreement was signed, to April 18, 2003, when the Ivorian government accepted ICC jurisdiction-strongly supports the claim that Gbagbo took all available measures not to share power with the rebellion by preventing already-appointed "rebel" ministers from claiming their seats in the cabinet. 67 Gbagbo's heuristic approach did not stop with the declaration of acceptance of ICC jurisdiction hastily faxed to the OTP. Indeed, his government persisted in undermining the implementation of the powersharing agreement and eventually succeeded in September 2003, when the rebel leadership announced they had resigned and quit the unity government.
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B. Uganda
Uganda is the ideal case for this study because state leaders consistently preferred militaristic over political approaches to the LRA problem and behaved accordingly long before and after inviting ICC scrutiny. The Ugandan government referred the situation concerning the LRA to the ICC prosecutor on December 16, 2003. 69 There is a wealth of historical evidence on the Ugandan executive branch's constant preference for a military approach to the LRA problem. 70 Facing opposition at home, 71 Museveni skillfully interpreted the changing geopolitical landscape and seized new opportunities provided by the "War on Terror." 72 His government reached an agreement with its Sudanese counterpart under American auspices and, as a result thereof, was granted permission to carry out military operations against LRA bases on a limited portion of Sudanese soil. 73 This vast cross-border offensive, known as operation "Iron Fist," ended in November 2003 with mixed results. 74 Contrary to Museveni's expectations, indeed, the LRA "appeared to make progress in late 2003 and the beginning of 2004." 75 Lastly, events that occurred after the self-referral, like operations "Iron Fist II" (2004) and "Lighting Thunder" (2008), 76 lend further support to the claim that Museveni treated peace talks merely as opportunities for the rebellion to surrender unconditionally. 77 On military inability, the balance of power was overwhelmingly in favor of the Ugandan People's Defense Force ("UPDF") in 2003. With 40-45,000 active members, 1800 paramilitaries, and around 3000 local militiamen, the UPDF confronted around 1500 LRA members, the majority of whom were based across the border in Sudan. 78 Furthermore, those numbers do not reflect considerations like military discipline, training, and equipment: all factors further stacking the deck in favor of the UPDF. Rather than a favorable balance of power, the two major factors impeding a decisive victory were the technology of rebellion and the Sudanese logistical and military assistance. The latter impediment was overcome with the signing of a bilateral agreement between Kampala and Khartoum in March 2002, whereby the latter permitted the UPDF to cross into southern Sudan in order to attack LRA bases. 79 As a result, the LRA could no longer enjoy safe haven across the border. 80 Still, the technology of the rebellion is sufficient to explain why a well-trained and well-equipped state army has thus far been unable to decisively quash a rebel group composed mostly of child soldiers. 81 
C. The Democratic Republic of Congo
The DRC's political and military landscape in 2003-2004 was beyond chaotic. On paper, the DRC armed forces (known by their French acronym "FARDC") included some 60,000 soldiers and 3000 air force members. They often worked in cooperation with the United Nations Mission in the DRC ("MONUC"), which deployed over 17,000 active troops and observers. 82 What these figures do not reveal, however, is that FARDC troops were in a dreadful state, as they "suffer[ed] from insufficient funding for food, salaries and equipment." 83 In addition, the FARDC confronted two major rebellions-namely the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo ("MLC") 84 in the north and the Congolese Rally for Democracy ("RCD") 85 in the eastwhose common intents were to overthrow the government sitting in Kinshasa alongside several non-state thousand-unit-strong groups active at the local or regional level. 86 While the MONUC contingent began to disarm warring factions in Ituri on February 18, 2004, this effort did not-and could notsignificantly affect the manpower factor by the time the government of Kinshasa invited ICC scrutiny over the entire national territory on March 3, 2004. But the balance of power between state and rebel forces was neither the only nor the most important obstacle impeding military victory for the FARDC. All of the above-listed factors were present and carried explanatory weight: rebels employed guerrilla tactics; foreign nations internationalized the conflict by assisting, when not directly creating, non-state armed groups; and the DRC's immense territory made it virtually impossible for the government to project power onto remote regions. Given the grim political landscape and military reality his government confronted in early 2004, President Kabila had good reasons to play along with international efforts aimed at sharing power among key domestic players. Such players included his two main political rivals and former military opponents, RCD leader Azarias Ruberwa and MLC leader Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo. Indeed, it would have been prudent for him to focus on consolidating power in Kinshasa and nearby provinces before-a concern that materialized on March 28, 2004, when government troops eventually warded off attacks against military installations and television headquarters in what was reportedly a coup attempt against him. 88 Yet, as discussed elsewhere in greater detail, Kabila saw the ICC as a way to criminalize his former enemies and, in so doing, undermine the implementation of the foreign-sponsored power-sharing agreement. 89 The plan of co-opting and subverting ICL norms and institutions exceeded expectations, for the MONUC contingent successfully pursued and apprehended several warlords beyond state reach. two-term limit for the presidency. 95 The new constitution entered into force on December 27, 2004. 96 On December 16, 2004-just two days before the self-referral-the highest functioning court in the country certified the CAR judiciary's inability to investigate and prosecute former President Patassé and Congolese Vice-President Bemba Gombo as they were both in exile at that time. 97 Because of this inability, the court "recommended referring the matter to the ICC." 98 To nobody's surprise, on January 4, 2005, Bozizé excluded his predecessor's candidacy "on the grounds that [he was] being prosecuted for 'blood crimes and economic crimes.'" 99 Patassé's legal problems stretched beyond the CAR, for he "was a likely suspect in the ICC investigation in the CAR." 100 His death in 2011 may explain why a formal indictment never materialized, yet there is no doubt the troops under his command, along with their foreign allies, committed egregious human rights violations between 2002 and 2003. 101 Thus, the state invitation of ICC scrutiny causally follows the impossibility to apprehend Patassé, who had been in exile since March 2003. 102 In all, Bozizé was at a critical turning point of his journey to power at the time his government invited ICC scrutiny. On the one hand, he sought the legitimacy of an electoral win to consolidate his authority; 103 on the other hand, his main enemies escaped his reach and continued to pose a constant threat to his survival. 104 There is no doubt that Bozizé's government was too weak to pursue any military option to enhance power consolidation in December 2004. First, he
In the months leading up to the referral, the security situation disintegrated into mayhem as sectarian tensions soured and former victims became perpetrators. This latest wave of mass violence did not spare the capital Bangui. 117 International military assistance notwithstanding, 118 the sitting government proved unable to contain, let alone stop, ongoing bloodshed. Massacres had sadly become a constant feature of life in the CAR well before Catherine Samba-Panza took office, and the month of May 2014 was no exception. On May 1, for example, fifteen people were killed near the border with Chad.
119 On May 5, unidentified gunmen attacked French peacekeepers.
120 On May 9, the United Nations ("U.N.") Security Council imposed sanctions on high-profile CAR nationals, including Séléka and antiBalaka leaders and former president Bozizé. 121 Sanctions apparently failed to exert any constraining or deterring effects, for on May 10, armed men rounded up and burned thirteen people alive. 122 Fearing spillover effects into their country, the Chadian government shut down its border with the CAR on May 12. On May 22, French peacekeepers confronted hundreds of Muslims who refused to disarm in Bambari. French forces again engaged in combat with Séléka militants two days later. On May 28, gunmen attacked a church in Bangui, killing at least seventeen people and abducting twenty-seven. Christian militiamen retaliated the following day by plundering a mosque in Bangui. 123 On May 30-the day the referral letter was signed-Catherine Samba-Panza publicly stated that the armed groups' aim was to destabilize her government. The same day, Burundian peacekeepers clashed with protesters in the capital, killing two. 124 Finally, on May 31, hundreds of Muslims took to the streets in Bangui to demand a safe exit from the capital. 125 In conclusion, the CAR is perhaps the easiest case to test the theoretical argument put forth herein, as state authority had collapsed and the acting government was unable to broadcast power over the capital city, let alone over the entire national territory.
E. Mali
The Mali self-referral aptly illustrates the logic underlying state invitation of external judicial scrutiny. On March 22, 2012, the military removed two-term President Amadou Toumani Touré from power. 126 This coup d'état took place five weeks before presidential elections were scheduled to take place. 127 To justify its action, the military junta lamented Touré's weak and half-hearted response against the new Tuareg rebellion (the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad-"MNLA") that had emerged in mid-January and had controlled the northern regions since that time. 128 The situation further deteriorated on April 6, when the rebellion declared the independence of Azawad from Mali.
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The military junta's strategy was three-pronged. First, by ousting the recalcitrant Touré, coup leaders sought to change state preferences in coping with the MNLA problem and adopt a more decisive military approach thereto. On this point, upon taking office on April 12, the new interim leader and former speaker of the parliament, Dioncounda Traoré, promised "total war" against the MNLA and newly formed Islamist groups claiming control of northern Mali. 130 Second, by inviting ICC scrutiny, Malian state authorities aimed to focus international attention on an otherwise peripheral conflict and criminalize the rebellion along with the Islamist groups. 131 To this end, the Malian government referred its own domestic situation dating back to January 2012, thereby ensuring that ICC jurisdiction would cover war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed-mostly by non-state actorsin the six months immediately prior to the self-referral.
Third, state efforts to criminalize internal enemies were crucial to forestall the African Union ("AU") and ECOWAS's attempts at finding a political solution to the crisis and convincing the military junta to relinquish power. 132 By calling instead for the deployment of 3300 ECOWAS troops in November 2012 and also for French military intervention in December 2012, the Malian state invited an intervention that significantly altered the balance of power among the warring parties. 133 There was wide consensus among interim authorities on the need for French military intervention, due to the Malian state's inability to quash the Tuareg rebellion at the time the interim government referred its situation to the ICC. 134 The first factor contributing to its inability was an unfavorable balance of power. Historically small and underfunded, 135 the Malian army had an estimated strength of 7350 personnel, alongside 4800 paramilitaries and 3000 militiamen. 136 When the MNLA emerged in January 2012, "Mali's armed forces suffer[ed] from low morale, politicization and outdated equipment." 137 The air force-a key element of state military advantage over the rebellion-was small in size and only "intermittently capable of delivering limited strike capabilities." 138 The army was not faring any better, for it was reportedly forced to withdraw during clashes with the rebels due to ammunition shortages. 139 Conversely, Tuareg tribesmen "had returned from fighting in Libya in possession of relatively sophisticated arms." 140 The deployment of ECOWAS troops and French military intervention eventually redressed the balance of power but could not overcome the other major factor currently at play in Mali: political geography. Because of its shape, infrastructure, and population distribution, the Malian state has been unable to broadcast power onto the northern half of the country for decades.
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Military officers are painfully aware of the adverse effects of political geography on a state's ability to exert control over desert regions. According to a high-ranking officer, "it is impossible, for States, like Mali and Mauritania, to insure an effective security of the region without the appropriate aerial surveillance equipment. For the quasi-deliquescent Malian state, the situation is [even] worse." 142 In all, political geography, alongside the balance of power, explains why Mali has long been "characterized by vast state-less areas, particularly in the northern Tuareg-dominated regions."
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F. Ukraine
The Government of Ukraine lodged its first declaration under Article 12(3) on April 17, 2014, and a second one on September 8, 2015. The latter was instrumental in extending the ICC's temporal jurisdiction beyond the narrow time frame specified in the first declaration and to reaffirm Ukraine's commitment to the ICC after democratically elected President Petro Poroshenko replaced acting President Oleksandr Turchynov.
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At that time, the government, led by Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, faced a dire domestic situation. First, President Yanukovychthe main suspect for ordering the police to break up protests in Independence Square (Maidan) on February 18, 2014 and the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the acting government on February 24-had fled the country and found refuge in Russia. 145 Second, the March 16 referendum added the trappings of democratic legitimacy to Russia's annexation of Crimea. Third, in early April, government forces were struggling to reassert control over eastern provinces after pro-Russian separatists seized provincial administration buildings in eastern Ukraine's major cities and proclaimed independence from Kiev. 147 Against this backdrop, Ukraine's military response was timid at best. Prime Minister Yatsenyuk reiterated the government's official position on March 5, 2014, claiming that the embattled Crimean peninsula must remain part of Ukraine. 148 Public announcements notwithstanding, skirmishes between Ukrainian and Russian forces took place repeatedly during the first half of March as the latter consolidated its hold on Crimea. 149 On March 20 and 22, pro-Russian crowds stormed Ukrainian military bases in Crimea, seizing two warships and capturing the commander of an air force base. 150 On March 24, the government of Kiev de facto acknowledged defeat as it ordered the evacuation of its troops from the occupied peninsula. 151 The situation in eastern Ukraine was dire, but the government "demonstrated resolve to restore its territorial integrity through the use of military force." 152 Russia's stated intention not to invade eastern Ukraine and only unofficial support of the secessionists may partially explain this uneven resolve. 153 Unable to confront Russia militarily, Ukraine's strategy has been an ode to institutional balancing by "counter[ing] pressures or threats through initiating, utilizing, and dominating multilateral institutions." 154 Put otherwise, the government of Kiev switched the battlefield with diplomatic fora and international courts in hopes of raising the political costs of Russian aggression. On March 15, 2014, Russia vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution declaring Crimea's secession illegal. While Russia fended off this attempt, China's abstention signaled Moscow's diplomatic isolation on the issue. 155 On March 27, the U.N. General Assembly passed a non-binding resolution invalidating Crimea's referendum and reaffirming Ukraine's territorial integrity. 156 Lacking the veto power to block this resolution, Russia nevertheless persuaded or threatened several countries not to back the resolution. 157 As a result, the General Assembly's half-hearted support for Ukraine's territorial integrity could not be interpreted as a diplomatic success and called for further action. 158 On April 17, the Government of Ukraine lodged an Article 12(3) declaration accepting ICC jurisdiction. 159 The OTP quickly followed up and, on April 25, opened a preliminary examination of the situation in Ukraine. 160 On the eastern front, events took a positive turn after the election of Poroshenko to the presidency. In late May, the Ukrainian army stepped up its military efforts against the separatists in the eastern provinces. 161 Lack of popular support, poor coordination within the insurgency, eccentric leadership, and inadequate military training all contributed to the defeat of the rebellion by the Ukrainian military on May 26. 162 Despite Russian assistance, the military balance of power unequivocally favored the Ukrainian military over the insurgency. In response to the defeat, the Russian government allegedly provided the insurgents with advanced equipment, including antiaircraft weapons, and replaced the rebel leadership. 163 Ukraine's lawfare strategy began to pay dividends in November 2016 when the OTP issued its yearly report on preliminary examination activities accusing Russian forces of having committed war crimes during and after the annexation of Crimea. 164 In rejecting these allegations, Russian authorities symbolically unsigned the Rome Statute, alleging in turn that the Court is politically biased. 165 Lastly, on January 16, 2017, Ukraine sued the Russian Federation before the International Court of Justice, accusing the latter of financing terrorism and discriminating against ethnic and religious minorities in Crimea. 166 In conclusion, the imbalance of power between Ukrainian and Russian forces was such that the government of Kiev limited military violence to the bare necessities and instead explored alternative ways and means to contrast enemy action. Having failed to garner enough political support at the U.N. level, lawfare became a tactic of last resort.
G. Palestine
The government of Palestine lodged two declarations accepting ICC jurisdiction under Article 12(3). The first, submitted on January 22, 2009, granted the Court jurisdiction over acts committed on the territory of Palestine since July 1, 2002. 167 The second, filed on January 1, 2015-one day before Palestine acceded to the Rome Statute-modeled the Court's temporal jurisdiction and included crimes allegedly committed since June 13, 2014. 168 Hamas militants, reached its peak in early January after the Israeli Defense Forces ("IDF") successfully carried out ground, air, and drone operations against Hamas leaders and targets, including weapon storages and smuggling tunnels. 169 Israeli troops advanced into the Gaza Strip; Hamas militants retreated into urban centers. 170 As war entered Palestinian cities, the civilian population became increasingly caught up in combat operations. On January 17, Israel agreed to a weeklong ceasefire, and Hamas militants followed suit the next day. 171 The IDF concluded the three-week offensive on January 21 when troops pulled out from the Gaza Strip. 172 The end of hostilities did not bring about lasting peace; rather, it moved the Israeli-Palestinian conflict toward non-military avenues, including the ICC. 173 It is worth noting the parties' reaction to the end of combat operations, for both sides were concerned about the perceived external legitimacy of the military offensive that had just concluded. On January 21, the Israeli foreign minister embarked on a diplomatic mission to Europe "in a bid to rally international support to end arms smuggling into the Hamas-ruled territory." 174 The Palestinians responded by lodging the abovementioned declaration under Article 12(3). 175 By doing so, they purported to criminalize the same action the Israelis aimed to legitimize. Furthermore, the choice of using international laws and institutions resonated with the intended audience, for European powers favor non-coercive alternatives to conflict resolution and staunchly support the ICC. 176 That said, this first attempt at inviting ICC scrutiny fell short of the Palestinians' expectations as the crucial legal question revolved around the status of Palestine under international law.
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After temporizing for more than three years, in April 2012, the ICC chief prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo declined Palestine's referral to avoid taking a position on the thorny question of Palestinian statehood-a question he deemed appropriate for a political, rather than legal, organ to address and resolve. 178 On January 1, 2015, the government of Palestine lodged a second Article 12(3) declaration, accepting ICC jurisdiction retrospectively to June 13, 2014. 179 In the summer of 2014, the Gaza Strip became the unwilling stage of yet another episode of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after the IDF launched Operation Protective Edge in response to sustained rocket fire from Gaza into Israel. 180 This operation resulted in 51 days of intense hostilities and severely weakened Hamas. 181 Still, the Israeli victory claimed a high civilian death toll: 2251 Palestinian casualties, of which 1462 were civilians. 182 The acceptance of an unconditional ceasefire by both sides officially ended the conflict on August 26, 2014, yet clashes continued in the following months due to, among other factors, the Israeli government's approval of new settlements in East Jerusalem. 183 On December 20, 2014, the IDF carried out the first air strike against a Hamas site in response to a rocket fired from Gaza into Israeli territory the day before. 184 Another similar attack followed on December 24. 185 Israelis wounded and one Palestinian killed. 186 On December 30, a draft resolution calling for the end of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem and the establishment of a Palestinian state by 2017 was tabled before the U.N. Security Council but fell one vote short of the required majority.
187 U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N. Samantha Power criticized the draft resolution as an unproductive step toward a negotiated settlement, adding that the draft "sets the stage for more division, not for compromise."
188 President Mahmoud Abbas signed onto the Rome Statute of the ICC on December 31, and the following day his government lodged the abovementioned declaration under Article 12(3). 189 It was immediately clear to all that Palestine's accession to the Rome Statute was instrumental in exposing IDF leaders to prosecution for alleged war crimes and to heighten tension with the government led by Benjamin Netanyahu. 190 In all, this case study demonstrates that the logic of enemy criminalization applies to interstate and intrastate wars alike. Cognizant of its military weakness vis-à-vis one of the most efficient armies in the world, the Palestinian leadership has long understood that the battlefield is not the optimal venue in which to redress its grievances against a militarily superior neighbor. From this perspective, the ICC is simply the last in chronological order of a long list of external actors invited to intervene in-or interfere with-the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As Samantha Power rightly pointed out, however, what distinguishes the ICC from other third parties is the expectation that its intervention will make externally sponsored conflict resolution efforts less likely to succeed.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The concept of lawfare is moving away from the battlefield, where it once belonged, and toward more political avenues. State leaders have realized the political potential of delegitimizing military enemies and political rivals by making them the targets of ICTs' investigations and rulings. 191 To earn the payoffs of inviting external judicial scrutiny, state leaders need not wait for a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt; formal indictments, arrest warrants, and reports submitted by U.N.-mandate commissions of inquiry and OTP statements tamper reputations when names are named. As state leaders master the inner workings of the international criminalization processes, they successfully export lawfare outside the battlefield.
The self-referrals submitted to the OTP by the Union of the Comoros (2013) and Gabon (2016) were excluded from the previous analysis on the grounds that their governments faced neither a conflict nor a post-conflict domestic scenario at the time they formally invited ICC scrutiny. However, they deserve mention now, for they aptly illustrate the future directions of norm exploitation and subversion applied to ICL.
These two self-referrals pertain to distinct levels of politics. The one by the Comorian government relates to the country's foreign policy, and it is thus far the only invitation of ICC scrutiny by a state party against non-party nationals. 192 The lack of information on the domestic decision-making process makes it only possible to speculate as to why the Union of the Comoros referred the Mavi Marmara incident to the ICC despite not having suffered tangible or intangible losses from said incident (merely on the ground that the attacked vessel flew a Comorian flag).
193 That said, the incentive structure may help explain why the Union of the Comoros proved so eager to play a supporting role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On the one hand, historians and political scientists have long discussed the economic 191 See, e.g., Bosco, supra note 173, at 155. the CAR, and allegedly Gabon) and non-state actors uninterested in competing for political power by peaceful means (e.g., Nigeria and Mali). 200 Since civilian victimization defies the raison d'être of the laws of warsparing unnecessary human suffering and protecting civilians-the link between political violence and external judicial scrutiny is easy to grasp. Put differently, deliberately targeting civilians in the pursuit of broader strategic goals almost inevitably amounts to a crime against humanity.
After shedding light on state strategies of institutional co-optation and norm exploitation, the last remaining task is to lay out policy recommendations to contain, if not to reverse, this trend. State use of international laws and courts in the furtherance of extralegal objectives undercuts the ICC's work in a two-fold manner. First, it negatively affects perceptions of justice and fairness, insinuating that the Court submits to state will and interests. 201 Second, it impacts OTP decisions on resource allocation, for more preliminary examinations or official investigations do not necessarily carry along more financial contributions from state parties. Thus, the OTP should receive state referrals with healthy skepticism, promises of cooperation notwithstanding. In particular, the OTP must carefully gauge the pros and cons of self-referrals as opposed to those of proprio motu investigations. The former assures friendlier state attitudes toward the Court and the prospect of greater cooperation but jeopardize perceptions of impartiality; the latter shield the Court from such negative perceptions but increase the risk of state confrontation and noncompliance. In light of recent events, the OTP should resist the temptation of ignoring political considerations and dismissing the positive externalities stemming from selfreferrals. Yet a policy favoring state cooperation over perceived impartiality will pay dividends in the short to medium run, while tampering the Court's long-run reputation. Thus, adopting such a policy would signal a dramatic shift in the OTP's time horizon-from long-to short-term-for casting aside reputational concerns makes sense only if and when the outlook on the Court's survival is negative.
